Politische Ikonographie : Der Kranke Philosoph und der Andere Als Gift Über Gewalt und Hypochondrie by Bojanić, Petar D.
Petar Bojaniæ UDK: 130.31:321.011
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Beograd DOI:10.2298/FID0802049B
POLITICAL IMAGERY: SICK PHILOSOPHER
AND OTHER AS POISON1
On Violence and Hypochondria
Apstrakt: U ovom radu pokušavam da rekonstruišem Levinasovo èitanje He-
gela i njegovo razumevanje nasilja (neprijatelja i rata), slueæi se tekstovima Franza
Rosenzweiga o Hegelovoj dravi i Derridinom interpretacijom razlièitih atributa na-
silja kod Emmanuel Levinasa. Interesovaæe me klasifikacija nekih figura nasilja iz
razlièitih perioda Hegelovog ivota i njihovi tragovi u Levinasovim tekstovima poèevši
od teksta „Liberté et commandement“ iz 1953. godine. Analiza slavne Hegelove ana-
logije iz njegove Rechtsphilosophie o suverenosti i organizmu, odnosno èitanje nekih
paragrafa njegove Naturphilosophie, treba da objasne vezu izmeðu totaliteta i nasilja,
kao i Levinasovu „ontologiju kao alergologiju“ odnosnoDerridinu autoimunologiju.
Kljuène reèi: bolest, nasilje, drugi, suverenost, filozof, alergija, homeopati-
ja, imunologija
Imprecision, and the primary difficulty of this task stand be-
tween the eventual title Allergologies…—I insist upon the word
‘other,’ o allos,2 a foreigner and the other who is left behind, who is
an Other, another—and the eventual subtitle of this text, From an
Analogy of Sovereignty to Attributes of Violence (From Hegel to
Derrida)… How should (I hesitate to speak about thematisation and
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1 Èlanak je raðen u okviru nauèno-istraivaèkog projekta „Instituta za filozo-
fiju i društvenu teoriju“ u Beogradu Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih pro-
cesa u Srbiji: civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za buduænost, koji finan-
sira Ministarstvo nauke i zaštite ivotne sredine Republike Srbije (br. 149031). Prva
verzija ovoga teksta prezentirana je 30. maja 2008. u Beèu (“Institut für Wissenschaft
und Kunst”), u okviru kolokvijuma “Zwischen Hegel und Levinas”.
2 Allergy was first spoken of here, in this city, in Vienna, in German. Der Wie-
ner Kinderarzt, Clemens Freiherr von Pirquet, published a text about allergy in the
journal Müncher Medizinische Wochenschrift in 1906. The Greek root of this word
is, of course, made up. Through an analogy with the word en—érgeia (internal bodily
force), von Pirquet makes the word all—érgeia, “als Ausdruck von Reaktionen auf
körperfremde Stoffe.“
researching) action [ergon] directed towards the other and speaking
[logos] of that other (or the work or actions of that other) be pursued;
that is, how should we maintain resistance towards the other and the
resistance of the other, in a complicated context and on a path begin-
ning with an analogy of sovereignty (again logos) and ending with
attributes of violence?
The second problem is found in eventual subtitle, feeding
back into the imaginary title, and then in the further deformation and
transformation of the title Allergologies into possible titles such as
Immunologies or (Auto)immunologies. The possibility of the figures
of the ‘other,’ ‘violence,’ ‘sovereignty,’ ‘war,’ or ‘enemy’ being
thematised and imagined through a new, more developed, and future
bio-analogy, always slightly more precise, should decide if there is
justification for the task I am undertaking. Nuance, and it is precisely
within nuance that my hopes lie, assumes that a more promising
form, foreshadowing and bringing greater security and greater pro-
tection for the other, may be found and always can be found.
But how can the detection of one or many violent acts in rela-
tion to the other, which every allergology or immunology presup-
poses (and doesn’t allergy already belong to autoimmune strate-
gies?), protect the other? Not protect me, or us, or the same, or my
relations with the other (proving the same, or rendering the other be-
nign and non-threatening), but precisely, and most importantly, the
other. Does perhaps the protection of the other, certainly protection
from me and from my assimilation, conversely, presume the accep-
tance of allergy, of distance, and of prevention? Does then an allergy
or immunity to the other protect the other from us? In the same way,
can delicacy and a possible transformation of allergologies into
(auto)immunology, surpass all the problems associated with a change
of meaning and context (in the 1970s, ‘allergy’was colloquially used
to signify a reaction to the other, even a ‘instinctive hostility’ or an
‘animosity before enmity’)? Does (auto)immunology lead to greater
protection of the other, because it retreats before the other, or leaves it
alone, because the same (me or us) clashes with itself as the other, be-
cause the same divides itself, because it brings itself into question,3 it
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3 Levinas asks: “Can the Same [le Même] welcome the Other [l’Autre], not by
giving the Other to itself as a theme [en se le donnant pour theme] (that is to say, as
being) but by putting itself in question? Does not this putting in question [mise on
question] occur precisely when the Other has nothing in common with me, when the
recognizes itself as the enemy and the other, because it fights with it-
self and with its own fictitious fantasies of hostility and allergies?
Despite the fact that chronic sickness has for centuries had a
controversial status and the advantage of differing elements which pro-
duce this (bio)analogy (and counter analogy) – i.e. the whole, totality,
the state, the community, the organism, the body – I insist that it is pre-
cisely the secret condition and factor for the existence of the analogy.
Sickness is the beginning, end, and the limiting frame of my
words: Hegel’s sickness of sovereignty and his homeopathic strategy,
Rosenzweig’s therapy and infusion into the sick and paralyzed body of
the philosopher (“alle Symptome von akuter Apoplexia philoso-
phica“4), Levinas’ discovery that the source and birth of philosophy is
in allergy (“… la philosophie est vraiment née d’une allergie”5),
Derrida’s epithets and attributes of violence6 and his construction of
immunity and autoimmunity as the foundations of the community.7 I
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Other has nothing in common with me, when the Other is wholly other, that is to say,
a human Other [lorsqu’il est tout autre, c’est-à-dire Autrui]?” E. Levinas, “Transcen-
dence and Height“, in A. Paperzak, S. Critchley and R. Bernasconi, eds. and trans.,
Basic Philosophical Writings (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1996), 16 / E. Levinas, “Transcendance et hauteur” (1962), in Liberté et com-
mandement (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1994), 76.
4 F. Rosenzweig, Das Büchlein vom gesunden und kranken Menschenver-
stand (1921), (Düsseldorf: Joseph Melzer Verlag, 1964), 57 / F. Rosenzweig, Under-
standing the Sick and the Healthy, trans. N. Glatzer, with introduction by H. Putnam
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1999), 59.
5 E. Levinas, “Transcendance et hauteur,” 76 / “… that philosophy is truly
born of an allergy”, E. Levinas., “Transcendence and Height“, 16.
6 Derrida’s text “Violence et métaphysique. Essai sur la pensée d’Emmanuel
Levinas” (1964) is, before anything else, an essay on the supplements and attributes of
violence: “violence de la lumière” (125), “réactionnaire” (136), “historique” (136),
“païenne” (144), “la pire et pure violence” (158), “violence transcendantale” (173,
184), “originaire” (184), “violence pré-éthique” (184), “pire violence comme pré-vio-
lence” (191), “violence absolue” (191), “dernière et pire violence” (191), “ontologi-
que” (196), “violence éthique” (209), “violence nécessaire” (220), “violence ontologi-
que-historique” (220), “première violence” (221), “nihiliste” (221), etc. J. Derrida,
L’écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967) / J. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics.
An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in Writing and Difference, trans. A.
Bass (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 79-153.
7 In his final years Derrida speaks of these figures several times: Spectres de
Marx (Paris: Galilée, 1993), 224; Politiques d’amitiés (Paris: Galilée, 1994), 94; “Foi
et Savoir,” in La Religion: Seminaire de Capri, J. Derrida, G. Vattimo, eds., (Paris:
Seuil, 1996); “Interview with Giovanna Borradori,” in Philosophy in a time of Terror,
would first divide these four analogous interventions, four disparate
actions, into two columns. That is, I would like to classify four differ-
ing thoughts on violence into just two divisions: on one side is Hegel,
“the mystic of violence”8 [eine Mystiker der Gewalt], as Benjamin de-
fines him, and his moderator Rosenzweig (one of his most important
readers)9; on the other side are Emmanuel Levinas and his reader, the
sometimes severe corrector and moderator, Jacques Derrida. This divi-
sion should resemble a series of common breaks and unequal pauses in
the chronology of one column. If I had to preliminarily formulate a
new and different division on this same axis, where texts overlap and
continue one into the other, I would experiment and formulate things in
a completely different way. I would choose between two options: ei-
ther I would declare all four of these great undertakings and readings,
these “great books of violence and hostility,” as having a moderating
intention – all of them attempt to moderate or diminish the ‘extreme’
elements and differences which precede them (even Hegel, or rather,
Hegel more than any of the others); or I would set aside the joint action
ofRosenzweig andLevinas as the first and only true incident in the his-
tory of Western thought. These are not merely a small episode or inter-
mezzo, nor a short respite in the histories of violence and trust arguing
that violence is necessary if a goal is to be attained; meaning that there
is no justice, right, or law without the use of violence and without war.
This second option would then require that this incident be an unre-
peatable and rare occurrence par excellence, because it stands strongly
against the context it originates from and all that precedes it, and be-
cause, paradoxically, it owes its influence and persistence, I would say
its ‘survival,’ to all that will proceed and occur after it. Therefore, be-
tween Hegel and Derrida, Rosenzweig (with all of Levinas’ exagger-
ated caution and reservation in his reading of Hegel)10 and Levinas
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G. Borradori, ed., (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 95
and furthermore; Voyous (Paris: Gallilée, 2003), 60.
8 Letter to Scholem from January 31, 1918. W. Benjamin, Briefe I (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), 171.
9 Rosenzweig belongs to the later generation which studied Hegel’s legal and
political texts. His mentor Friedrich Meinecke places, into this group, among others,
Hermann Heller, Kantorowitz, Schmitt-Dorotiè and Kluckhohn. F. Meinecke, Cos-
mopolitanism and the National State (1907), trans. R. B. Kimber (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1970), 163, 198, 201.
10 In a 1965 text “Franz Rosenzweig: une pensée juive moderne,” Levinas
insists on this in three places (70, 74, 87), posing questions and formulating
himself would stand together. This sort of option would present two
problems and several levels of uncertainty and differing types of re-
sponsibility.
First, following some of Derrida’s comments in the text “Vio-
lence and Metaphysics,”11 the position, either of Rosenzweig or
Levinas (I dare say that they complement each other perfectly as
both read different Hegelian texts), should always be able, in every
situation of a renewed belief in violence (meaning today, immedi-
ately, now), to prove its adaptability and its contradiction in relation
to Hegel. The request that, for example, Levinas not repeat, nor con-
firm, nor hide his immanent Hegelianism (“Levinas is very close to
Hegel, much closer than he admits, and at the very moment when he
is apparently opposed to Hegel in the most radical fashion”12), could
be realized through the continual evaluation of this position by
means of Hegel’s differing formulas and combinations.
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dilemmas about the existence of strictly “rosenzweigian” Hegel, who has no connec-
tion with Meinecke’s influence and with “Friedrich Meinecke’s Hegel.” The final,
third question, is a sharp critique of and distancing from Rosenzweig. “As for the
fundamental question, the break with Hegel (whether or not the Hegel of Meinecke
[fût-ce le Hegel de Meinecke])—the affirmation, above the state and political his-
tory, of the eternal people and its eternal way takes on a personalist signification
[une signification personnaliste], in which others, since then, have hoped to find
a solution on the contradiction of the world.” E. Levinas, Hors sujet (Paris: Fata
Morgana, 1987), 87 / E. Levinas, Outside the Subject, trans. M. B. Smith (Lon-
don: The Athlone Press, 1993), 50, 53, 64. It seems that Levinas overstates
Rosenzweig’s own admission in the prologue of his book on Hegel; that Rosen-
zweig wishes to follow Meinecke and his interpretation of the historical move-
ment from Hegel to Bismarck. Here I am not referring to Meinecke (or Rosen-
zweig) reading Bismarck‘s Machtstaat into early Hegelian texts. This does not
take Levinas’ objections into consideration.
11 I would classify Derrida’s inexhaustible reservations (“Would Husserl have
subscribed to his interpretation of his ‘interpretation’?”, 313; “and we wonder whet-
her Heidegger would have accepted this formulation,” 87) and numerous objections
into several groups: the objections to violence being necessary, that a certain amount
of violence “en une économie de la violence” is necessary (313n; 189, 190); that “this
encounter with the absolutely-other [rencontre de l’absolument-autre]” is impossible
without violence (95); that Levinas’ anti-Hegelianism is inconsistent in this or that
way or that Levinas is a closet Hegelian or that Levinas repeats Hegel (93, 98, 99,
112, 119, 120, 129, 130), etc.
12 Ibid., 99 / “Levinas est très proche de Hegel, beaucoup plus proche qu’il ne
le voudrait lui-même et ceci au moment où il s’oppose à lui de la manière apparem-
ment la plus radicale,” L’écriture et la différence, 147.
The second point or responsibility, produces the first and is
found in what follows from Derrida and his (Auto)immunology (I
have pointed out that what is necessary, for my proposed division to
be justified, is at least a slight belief in its potential and future13). In
order for the Rosenzweig-Levinas intervention, which speaks to the
principles of violence and war (therefore, the first institutes of phi-
losophy), to survive, to become an exemplary incident, it would
have to manifest its precision readily and its advantage in opposing
the great mystifications of violence before Hegel. I am, for example,
speaking of Kant, of the new tendency to inaugurate Kant’s fantasies
of peace, originating more than 200 years ago, as humanity’s most
effective answer to a crisis of international law and to a new justifi-
cations for violence and war.14
Three of Hegel’s gestures from his lectures on the philosophy
of right, three steps in the construction of a fatal analogy, could per-
haps formulate the first condition for the construction of a strategy
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13 I want to insist that Derrida’s sketch of one possible auto-immuno-logic
(“une sorte de logique de l’auto-immunisation” or “la logique générale de l’auto-im-
munisation.” J. Derrida, Foi et savoir, note 23 (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 67 / J. Derrida,
“Faith and Knowledge”, trans. S. Weber, in G. Anidjar, ed., Acts of Religion (New
York and London: Routledge, 2002), 80) contains within itself, and presupposes
completely differing difficulties with the understanding of the community and the ot-
her throughout the final decade. I am referring to several texts by Agamben, Esposi-
to, Sloterdijk, Sontag, Nancy, Haraway etc. See also texts J. Hillis Miller “Derrida
Enisled” and W. J. T. Mitchell “Picturing Terror: Derrida’s Autoimmunity”, W. J. T.
Mitchell and Arnold I. Davidson, eds., The Late Derrida (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007), 30-73.
14 Jacques Derrida attempts to begin a task which he himself set in his 1964
text on Levinas. “It is perhaps to be regretted that no systematic and patient confron-
tation has been organized with Kant in particular. To our knowledge, only an allusion
is made to the “Kantian echos,” and “to Kant’s practical philosophy to which we feel
particularly close,”—and this barely in passing—in one article (“L’ontologie est-elle
fondamentale?”). J. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics. An Essay on the Thought
of Emmanuel Levinas,” 314n / L’écriture et la difference, 142. See also J. Derrida,
Adieu, à Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: Galilée, 1997), 70-73. In several places in the
book Adieu, as in his final interview published several months before his death, Der-
rida succeeds in partially systematizing and explaining his belief in Kant’s project
concerning peace into one form of sovereignty and into violence inspired by Kant’s
understanding of right (he speaks of European armed forces and of a specific military
intervention which should occur first in Israel). See also P. Bojanic, “Die Übertra-
gung des Krieges in Frieden: Mit Frieden vergelten”, A. Hirsch, P. Delhom, eds.,
Denkwege des Friedens. Aporien und Perspektiven, (Freiburg and München: Verlag
Karl Alber, 2007), 168-176.
which encompasses several elements: war, violence, sacrifice, sov-
ereignty, negation, the enemy, and the other. But before we get to
Hegel’s gestures and to a ‘Hegelian construction’ (this is what I
would like to call it, because it is exclusively Hegel’s and could be a
condition for every theory of violence, war, sacrifice, the enemy
etc…. for Hegel), here are two parameters I make use of and which
serve as preambles of “Hegel’s construction”:
(a) I am trying to find Hegel through my reading of Rosen-
zweig and Levinas, that is, the elementary ‘construction’ which the
two of them immediately recognize as Hegelian and instantly op-
pose. Rosenzweig uses the analogy of a sick philosopher, a patient,
as an idealism which should be turned around. So, what is it in Hegel
that should be turned around? Or, conversely, what is it that is sick
and upside down in Hegel? What is it in Hegel that is already in
Rosenzweig’s sanatorium?
As we have observed, our patient suffers from a radical inver-
sion [einer vollkommenen Umkehrung] of his normal func-
tions. It may be necessary to reverse the inversion, that is, turn
matters upside-down [dass es also notwendig ist, diese
Umkehr ihrerseits wieder umzukehren].15
(b) I am trying to find the ‘construction’ which has within it-
self, and also implies, all Hegel’s possible theories of violence, nega-
tions, enemies, war etc. One such always problematic and disputable
reduction of Hegel’s differing ideas and fragmentsmust cover, for ex-
ample, two instances from Science of Logic, which concern violence
coming from the outside, about the other and the reaction to the other
(section “Wirkung und Gegenwirkung”) and about the end and “me-
chanical violence” [die mechanische Gewalt] (“Der ausgeführte
Zweck”);16 determination about determination, negation, the border
and the absolute other from Encyclopaedia (just like Die Wissen-
schaft der Logik);17 argumentation about the other as evil, about
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15 F. Rosenzweig, Understanding the Sick and the Healthy, 55 / Das Büchlein
vom gesunden und kranken Menschenverstand, 50.
16 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic High-
lands: Humanities Press International, 1969), 567, 746 / Die Wissenschaft der Logik,
in Werke in 20. Bänden (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), vol. 6, 234, 452.
17 Paragraphs 91, 92 and 93 directly inspired Levinas. In them he could
find the concepts of the same, the other, the third and infinity. G. W. F. Hegel,
self-recognition within the other [das Sich-Erkennen im Andern]
from the 1805 / 1806 semester (Jenenser Realphilosophie);18 differ-
ing versions of the “struggle for recognition” [der Kampf des
Anerkennens], wars and confrontations among states, but also posi-
tions concerning “external or apparent beginning of states” [äusser-
liche oder erscheinende Anfang], despite understanding violence as
the “basis of right” [Grund des Rechts] or violence as a “substantial
principle” of the states;19 followed by Hegel’s muddled suggestions
concerning first violence [erste Gewalt], about the violence of the
hero, about the conversion of violence into right and about the battle
for right etc.
Here are the three fragments which, I believe, construct the
fastest path towards Rosenzweig and Levinas.
After two paragraphs (§ 160 and § 161) in which Hegel
speaks in detail of war and sacrifice for the state, at the very end of
the following paragraph (§ 162) in the lectures on Natural Right in
Heidelberg (semester 1817 / 1818), the philosopher speaks about
Kant’s project of perpetual peace which began with the idea that
there should be no war. However, Hegel says that war is “something
ethically necessary”, because without war peoples would drawn in
their private lives, “in security and weakness”, and would thus be
easy prey for other peoples. Hegel plays with this idea in several
places in texts from differing years.20 Hegel continues:
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The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geracts, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris (Indi-
anapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 147-150 / System der Philosophie,
Erster Teil. Die Logik (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1964), 218-222.
18 G. W. F. Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1931), vol. 2, 200-203.
19 § 432 and § 433. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,
trans. M. J. Petry (Dordrecht, Boston and London: D. Reidel, 1978), vol. 3, 57-65.
See also F. Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (1921) (Frankfurt am Main: Suhr-
kamp, 1996), 370.
20 “And therefore war preserves the ethical health of peoples [die sittliche Ge-
sundheit der Völker] in their indifference to specific institutions”. G. W. F. Hegel, Na-
tural Law (1802 / 1803), trans. T. M. Knox, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 1975), 93 / “Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des
Naturrechts”, in G. Lasson, ed., Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie (Leipzig:
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1923), 369. Several months later Hegel varies the same idea:
“What is ethical must itself intuit its vitality in its difference, and it must do so here in
such a way that the essence of the life standing over against it is posited as alien and to
be negative”. System of Ethical Life (1802 / 1803), trans. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox
It is also a well-meaning thought, advanced some thirty years
ago, that the human race should form a single state.21 What
holds the individual states together in such a league of all
states is merely an ‘ought’, and the whole league is based on
free choice [Willkür]. At all events the individual must desire
the opposite of war; but war is a philosophically essential ele-
ment of nature [Der Einzelne allerdings muß das Gegenteil
des Krieges wünschen; aber der Krieg ist ein philosophisch
wesentliches Naturmoment].22
Levinas himself could have formulated these two syntagma
which do not exist in this form in any other of Hegel’s texts—the
“ethical necessity” of war and war as something “essentially philo-
sophical”. War is not an element but is rather der Naturmoment, just
as states are small natural individuals which unite and gravitate to-
wards one whole. This movement towards one whole is always natu-
ral, essential, and philosophical. This is war.
Two years later, in Die “Rechtsphilosophie” von 1820
(named so by the editor of these lectures Karl-Heinz Ilting23), in a
note to § 278 “Der Staat als Subjekt der Souveränität” (Hegel added
these notes in the next several years), Hegel explains the sover-
eignty. The third point, out of five, is called “Der Idealismus der
Souveränität”.
The idealism which constitutes sovereignty [der die Souverä-
nität ausmacht] is the same characteristic as that in accor-
dance with which the so-called “parts” of an animal organism
are not parts but members, moments in an organic whole,
whose isolation and independence spell disease [organische
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(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), 147 / System der Sittlichkeit, in
G. Lasson, ed., Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, 466.
21 In questions is Kant’s text “Über den Gemeinspruch” (1793) in which he
speaks of his “proposal for an international state” and at the same time of the “im-
practicability” of such a project.
22 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, trans. P.
Wannenmann, J. M. Stewart and P. C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1995), 303-304 / Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatwissenschaft, Heildel-
berg 1817/18, Vorlesungen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983), vol. 1, 253;.
23 G. W. F. Hegel, Die “Rechtsphilosophie” von 1820, mit Hegels Vorlesungs-
notizen, 1821-1825 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974), vol. 2.
Momente sind und deren Isolieren und Für-sich-Bestehen die
Krankheit ist] (Cf. Encyclopedie § 293).24
Hegel probably wrote this sentence, in this form, in 1825.
Since then it has remained unchanged and has been identically repro-
duced in all the publications of his Philosophy of Right at the begin-
ning of § 278. Today, it is possible to follow the genesis of Hegel’s ar-
gument as the crystallization of the analogy between sovereignty and
the organism (organization, body), and as the revelation of a sickness
which connects two differing levels of Hegel’s system.25 Before this
1825 version, there is no sickness in the lectures on right, despite the
fact that sickness as a latent metaphor is present from the beginning in
Hegel’s political and juridical texts.26 On the other hand, in an early
text concerning Natural Right, sickness is mentioned and the analogy
is set in the same form as it will be later, but at that time Hegel lacks
the figures of sovereignty and the organism.
Sickness and the onset of death are there when one part orga-
nizes itself and eludes the dominion of the whole. By this iso-
lation the part affects the whole negatively or even compels it
to organize itself for this sphere alone – as, for example, when
the vitality of the entrails, in obedience to the whole, develops
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24 Ibid., 738. See also Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1942), 180 / Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke in 20.
Bänden, vol. 7, 442.
25 In his 1819 / 1820 lectures in Berlin (notes taken by J. R. Ringier and edited
by E. Angehrn, M. Bondeli H. N. Seelmann) Hegel mentions the notion of organism
(“Wie im Organismus jedes Glied...”), its membranes and the blood which flows and
holds all the organs together. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des
Rechts, Vorlesungen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000), vol. 14, 194. During the
same lectures, the ‘organization’, ‘blood’ and ‘Körper’ are mentioned. G. W. F. He-
gel, Philosophie des Rechts, Die Vorlesungen von 1819/20, D. Henrich, ed. (Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 275. In the lectures from 1822 / 1823 (from the notes
taken by K. W. L. Heyse) the organism is mentioned as well as Hegel’s differentiation
between Glieder and Teile. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, E. Schilbach, ed.
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999) § 269, 65.
26 Hegel finds the analogy or the source of the analogy between the nation and
body in Mendelssohn. Here is that famous fragment from Mendelssohn’s 1784 text,
later copied by Hegel on 31 May, 1787: “Eine gebildete Nation kennt in sich keine
andere Gefahr, als das Übermaß ihrer Nationalglückseligkeit, welches, wie die voll-
kommenste Gesundheit des menschlichen Körpers, schon an und für sich eine Krank-
heit oder der Übergang zur Krankheit genannt werden kann”. Dokumente zu Hegels
Entwicklung, J. Hoffmeister, ed. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974), 142.
into individual animals, or the liver makes itself into the rul-
ing organ and forces the whole organism to do its bidding.27
For Hegel sickness (as well as differing versions of hypochon-
dria28) is something much greater than a simple trauma which marked
his life and which was, after all, a frequent follower of philosophers
and philosophy. Hegel proclaims the unity of a state or the health and
completeness of an organism through openness and the possibility of
war (§ 321-324). Hegel continues that only through sacrifice
[Aufopferung] is idealism attained and the real is arrived at (as a spirit
or national spirit).29
Hegel’s third gesture is also quite difficult to locate in time.
That fragment is also the result of Ilting’s work. In question is cer-
tainly a later or perhaps even final Hegel, and a part of his commentary
in § 273 Philosophy of Right (“Die drei Gewalten”) called “Eine
naturphilosophische Analogie”30. Hegel differentiates between the
abstract moments of a state [gesetzgebende Gewalt, Regierungs-
gewalt, individuelle Gewalt] and a concrete concept of a state, as a liv-
ing whole in which every moment, in itself, organizes totality [als
lebendiges Ganzes jedes Moment in sich zu einer Totalität organisirt].
Hegel defines the philosophical-natural analogy as a living body
[lebendige Körper] in possession of three determinations. The second
determination, as Hegel writes (the first being sensibility, that is per-
ception, and the third reproduction) is Irritibilität or Irratibilität.
Diese Momente bestimmen sich nun als Systeme... das der
Irratibilität ein abstraktes System welches das Herz zu
seinem Mittelpunkte hat, das System der Andern.
The system of the other, or the other’s system is found in the
centre of a living body or living organism. The other’s system is at
the heart of the state.
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27 G. W. F. Hegel, Natural Law (1802-1803), 123 / “Über die wissenschaftli-
chen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts”, S. 400.
28 The notion of hypochondria is present in Hegel’s system since his 1803 /
1804 lectures in Jena. G. W. F. Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie (Leipzig: Felix Mei-
ner Verlag, 1932), vol. 1, 183. See also F. Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat (Aalen:
Scientia Verlag, 1962), vol. 1, 101-102.
29 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818-1831, K.-H. Il-
ting, ed. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974), vol. 4, 669.
30 Ibid., 662.
All of Hegel’s conditions (and there are certainly more than
the three which I sketched here) make the final construction more
comprehensible. Hegel himself says—and we saw his signal—that it
is found in § 293 of the first edition of Encyclopaedia “The Disease
of the Individual” (or § 371) or somewhere nearby. Hegel’s request
that we look at his demonstrations of the latest theories of sickness,
pharmacology and alternative therapies, while we try to understand
the figures of the state, sovereignty, war, enemy, the other or sacri-
fice and violence, paradoxically represents a danger to the consis-
tency of the system. “Homeopathy,”31 one more invented Greek
word used twice and explained in detail by Hegel, is a strategy which
resolves one of the greatest dilemmas of his political philosophy.
However, homeopathy introduces magic into dialectics, broadening
the importance of analogy (the analogy becomes not only the regula-
tive but also the constitutive instrument of a system, as analogy is in
itself therapy), it gives an advantage to the same, and not to the dif-
ferent or the other (homeopathy presumes a negation through the
same, and not with the other or different or opposite, which would be
a characteristic of allopathy), etc.
What then are we to find in the therapies for a sick organism,
which can only explain the secret poison which has suddenly ap-
peared in a sick state and a state without war?32 Can, equipped only
with this insight into medicine, into fatal sickness, the secret of that
strange strategy and fantastic power of one sovereign government to
organize a war for its own sovereignty (its own people), be revealed?
Levinas analyzes Hegel’s famous fragment from Phenomenology of
Spirit, onMarch 5, 1976 in his lecture onHegel’s Logic.33 Hegel says:
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31 Its creator, Samuel Friedrich Christian Hahnemann, a contemporary of He-
gel, arrives in Berlin in January 1831, only a month after Hegel’s death.
Hahnemann’s students are spread across Europe taking care of Cholera victims, a
disease which arrived in Western Europe from India through Russia.
32 “Secret poison” is a secret for Hegel, and he cites Gibbon “This long peace,
and the uniform government of the Romans, introduced a slow and secret poison into
the vitals of the empire [geheimes Gift in die Lebenskräfte des Reichs]. The minds of
men were gradually reduced to the same level, the fire of genius was extinguished,
and even the military spirit evaporated...” Natural Law (1802-1803), 101-102 /
“Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts”, 377. Derrida
mentions this fragment in the book Glas (Paris: Galilée, 1974), 117.
33 E. Levinas, Dieu, la mort et le temps (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1993), 95-97.
But Spirit is at the same time the power of the whole, which
brings these parts together again into a negative unity, giving
them the feeling of their lack of independence, and keeping
them aware, that they have their life only in the whole. [...] The
Spirit of universal assembly and association is the simple and
negative essence of those systems which tend the isolate them-
selves. In order not to let them become rooted and set in this
isolation, thereby breaking up the whole and letting the [com-
munal] spirit evaporate, government has from time to time to
shake them to their core by war. By this means the government
upsets their established order, and violates their right to inde-
pendence, while the individuals who, absorbed in their own
way of life, break loose from the whole and strive after the in-
violable independence and security of the person, are made to
feel in the task laid on them their lord and master, death.34
But how is this possible? How does the government of one
state or a sovereign, order a war? How is the “sovereign conserver”
(this was Hahnemann’s favourite metaphor) able to risk his own
body’s death and dose itself with war? What part of sovereignty is al-
ways apart from itself? Is the government in secret contact with the
enemy? Is a virtual enemy or virtual danger in question? What has
happened to the victims and sacrifices? How large a part (an amount,
number, dose) must be taken away from the whole for it still to be a
whole?
It seems as if in Hegel, the ghost of the analogy (and sickness)
circulates between (his) body and the state, and as if these lines from
the book Phenomenology of Spirit are preceded by Hegel’s thoughts
concerning medicine and therapy, and Hegel’s intuition and the sug-
gestions of an eternal patient.35 In the addition to § 373, which con-
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34 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1977), 272-273 / Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, vol.
3, 334-335.
35 Hegel is also preceded by Jean Bodin, an author whom Hegel never cited.
See fifth book of Les Six Livres de la République (Paris: Fayard, 1986), vol. 5, 137,
140, 142. Bodin writes: “Le plus beau moyen de conserver un estat et le garentir de
rebellions, seditions, et guerres civiles, et d’entretenir les subjects en bonne amitié,
est d’avoir un ennemi, auquel on puisse faire teste. [...] lesquels n’ont jamais trouvé
plus bel antidote des guerres civiles, ni remede plus certain, que d’affronter les sub-
jects à l’ennemi [...] Il n’y a donc moyen de nettoyer les Republiques de telle ordure,
cerns various therapies, Hegel finally finds affirmation. This para-
graph begins with sentences bearing a striking resemblance to the
understanding of sickness and medicine in the Jena lectures:36
It is by means of the healing agent [Heilmittel] that the organ-
ism is excited into annulling the particular excitement in
which the formal activity of the whole is fixed, and restoring
the fluidity of the particular organ or systemwithin the whole.
[...] In so far as they are negative stimuli, medicaments are
poisons [Die Arzneimittel sind insofern negative Reize,
Gifte]. When the external and alien substance of an indigest-
ible stimulant is administered to an organism alienated from
itself by disease, this organism is forced to counter its effect
by drawing itself together and entering into a process, by
means of witch it regains its sentience and subjectivity
[Selbstgefühl und zu seiner Subjektivität wieder gelange ].37
This is followed by the above-mentioned addition:
Homoeopathic theory [homöopathischen Theorie] in particu-
lar treats illness by prescribing an agent capable of bringing
forth the same disease in a healthy body. The effect of introduc-
ing this poison into the organism, and in general, of confront-
ing it with something obnoxious, is that the particularity in
which the organism is fixed becomes something external for it.
When the organism is diseased however, this particularity is
still one of its own properties.38 [...] Every disease, and espe-
cially acute disease, is a hypochondria of the organism
[Hypochondrie des Organismus], in which the organism
loathes the external world and repulses it. The reason for this is
that it is restricted to itself while containing its own negative.
As the medicine now stimulates it into digesting this negative
however, the organism is restored to the general activity of
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que de les envoyer en guerre, qui est comme une medicine purgative, et fort necessai-
re pour chasser les humeurs corrompus du corps universel de la Republique”.
36 G. W. F. Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie, vol. 1, 174-187 and vol. 2,
167-174.
37 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s philosophy of nature, M. J. Petry, ed. (London: Ge-
orge Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970), vol. 3, 202 / Enzyklopädie der philosophischen
Wissenschaften II, Werke, vol. 5, 529-530.
38 Ibid., 205 / 531.
assimilation. The precise way in which this effect is obtained
is by administering to the organism something which is much
more potently indigestible than its disease, and so forcing it to
draw itself together in order to overcome it. This results in the
internal division of the organism; for us the initially imma-
nent indisposition has now become external, the organism has
been duplicated internally into its vital force and its diseased
parts. This effect of medicine may well be regarded as magi-
cal. It resembles the effect of mesmerism in bringing the or-
ganism under the power of another person, for it is by means
of the medicament that the whole organism is subjected to this
specific determination succumbing as it were to the power of
a magician [der Gewalt eines Zauberers].39 [...]
Deciding which remedies are the right ones now presents us
with a difficulty [Zu sagen, welches nun die rechten Mittel seien,
ist schwer]. [...] In general, it may be said that the relationship
between disease and medicine is magical one [Das Verhältnis
der Krankheit zur Arznei ist überhaupt ein magisches].
This magical fragment which Jacques Derrida notices and
partially analyzes in the book Glas (he only mentions and does not
focus on “l’homéopathie, l’hypocondrie, l’hypnose, le sommeil
réparateur”),40 is one of the final novelties of the system. Homeopa-
thy is an addition to the system and a paradigm change, despite the
fact that Hegel has no more time, nor gives it any special status. Ho-
meopathy is just another form of therapy. But it is not the one and
only therapy replacing all others, nor can any other therapy take its
place. However, its significance, its militancy and at the same time
its greatness, and its magic, is comprised of the influence of the other
(or the influence of another man; here autre becomes Autrui).41 The
problem now is the misrecognition and misinterpretation of the same
and the other, the transformation of the same into the other and
conversely, the internal divisions into the same and the other, the
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39 Ibid., 206 / 532.
40 J. Derrida, Glas, 132-134.
41 Hegel already writes about violence and government [Gewalt] of magic
over the organism or power [Macht] of the foreign over the organism in his 1818 /
1819 lectures. G. W. F. Hegel, Naturphilosophie, Berlin 1819/20, M. Gies, ed., (Na-
poli: Bibliopolis, 1982), § 295, 144-145.
infinite production of the other, the negation of the other and the
power of the other to be the carrier of this negation.
Homeopathy, as the final addition to the system, deconstructs his
system in several stages. Iwould like to note and list severalmoments:
– homeopathy enters the system as therapy, in place of the or-
ganism’s sickness, unsuccessful treatment, death and the appearance
of the spirit;
– homeopathy is the kind of therapy that counts on the unity
and wholeness of the entire organism (this is its main difference in
relation to allopathy)
– as therapy, as something artificial—meaning that this strategy
requires a subject or sovereign (the brain, ratio, philosopher, statesman)
who can take care of body, organism, text, system, sovereignty, peo-
ple—its strategies and consequences are necessarily political;
– just as Hegel sends the readers of Philosophy of Right to
read his Philosophy of Nature, so his first student, and the first to de-
construct his text, makes a counter analogy. In the margins of the
Hegel’s book System der Philosophie (1841), written by Karl Lud-
wig Michelet, he adds the following note to Hegel’s addition § 373:
This does not contradict the statement made just previously,
that poison is more powerful, the form in which it makes itself
effective is less potent [denn eben weil das stärkere Gift in
minder mächtiger Form], being a merely external hostility
[äußerer Feind], which is more easily overcome than the in-
ternal hostility of the disease itself [als der innere Feind,
welcher die Krankheit selber ist].42
– the homeopathic strategy corrects Hegel’s understanding of
sickness which had generally remained the same from his earliest
texts: the sickness of an organism is a result of, in the last instance,
the inorganic that an organism still contains within itself (“Der
Organismus hat nun seine unorganische Potenz an sich selbst, so
bezieht er sich als ein Unorganisches auf sich”).43 The drama of
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42 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s philosophy of nature, 205 / System der Philosophie,
Sämtliche Werke, Zweite Teil, Naturphilosophie, with introduction by K. L. Michelet
(Stuttgart: Frommann, 1965), vol. 9, 712.
43 This is one of the formulations from Hegel’s Lectures. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorle-
sungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1819/20, M. Bondeli and H. N. Seel-
mann, eds. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002), 185-186.
sickness, and then death, occurs because the inorganic has not been
completely overcome. Symptoms of the inorganic are a division of
the organism, hypochondria and the isolation of parts of the organ-
ism. The homeopathic intervention which is to follow is multilay-
ered: it uncovers (a) that the other (with the inorganic as its proto-
type) cannot be fully incorporated and assimilated, (b) that there
exists an excess or waste or negation which is not calculated into the
system or into the organism and which is useless,44 (c) that there is an
external (“das Äusserliche ist so für mich ein Anderes aber ein
ideelles Anderes”),45 an other, a spiritual [Geistiges],46 medicine,
foreigner, poison, enemy (“L’ennemi ou le Dieu”),47 that is su-
premely indigestible by the organism, and which is just as hard to in-
corporate (this is how the idea of an absolute other, who can only ini-
tiate or whose purpose is to provoke an entity into being, but not be a
part of it, was discovered; this is the other as a laxatif, the other who
cannot be eaten, or the other who cannot not be Exkretion),48 (d) that
the exterior is analogous to (and not the same as) the interior, hence
the other (the same)which is added to the sick organism is analogous
to the inorganic, already present in the organism, (e) that it is the
other, or that the enemy is a function and that it is virtual.
“Was den Menschen interessirt ist sein Anderes,” says
Hegel.49 The other is not, but its silhouette is already framed, clear;
its place has been discovered, its independence is on its way. Despite
the other completely functioning in order to constitute the organism,
despite the other not bringing life—life and vital energy are not
65
FI
LO
ZO
FI
JA
ID
R
UŠ
TV
O
2/
20
08
44 In an interview in German given to Christoph von Wolzogen in 1985, Levi-
nas speaks of a similar negation found in Hegel’s Esthetics. “Intention, Ereignis und
der Andere. Gespräch zwischen E. L. und C. von W.”, in Der Humanismus des ande-
ren Menschen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1989), 137.
45 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie, Berlin, 1823-24, G. Mar-
masse, ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), 248.
46 G. W. F. Hegel, Naturphilosophie, Berlin 1819/20, § 295, 144.
47 “L’ennemi ou le Dieu sur lequel je ne peux pouvoir et qui ne fait pas partie
de mon monde...” E. Levinas, Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité (The Hague:
Kluwer Academic, 1961), 263.
48 See chapter “Prozess der Gattung”, G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die
Naturphilosophie, Berlin 1821/22, G. Marmasse und Th. Posch, ed., (Frankfurt am
Main: Peter Lang, 2002), 196-197.
49 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie, Berlin, 1823-24, 251.
within it—its task in forming a subject was never before as it is in
this homeopathic construction.
This construction is implicitly present within the
Rosenzweig—Levinas turn; more precisely, their intervention or
therapy becomes possible only with Hegel’s late addition, which
they never directly speak of. This can be seen in their strong resis-
tance to Hegel and in the insistence on therapy which is always in ab-
solute contradiction to what is in essence and exclusively ‘Hegel’s’
or ‘Hegelian’ in philosophy and in thought. In spite of the correct-
ness of marking the limits of such an inversion of Hegel and in show-
ing reservations towards the achieved outcome (isn’t Derrida trying
to do this all the time, while reading Levinas?), perhaps it is still nec-
essary to defend the future of an action which has only now begun.
Rosenzweig and Levinas add to one another in their resis-
tance to and conversion of Hegel’s position. It is possible to show
systematically both the complementary and simultaneous nature of
Rosenzweig’s reconstruction and the inversion of Hegel’s figures of
sovereignty (their analogies with the organism),50 Levinas’ trans-
forming of Hegel’s sacrifice for the homeland into a relationship and
meeting with the other,51 Rosenzweig’s modification of the relations
between violence [Gewalt] and right, Levinas’attempt to rethink ne-
gation while commending Hegel’s efforts, Rosenzweig’s insistence
on life, Levinas’ pages on war from Totality and Infinity,52 etc.
Probably, even before these grand themes, there exists an im-
minent proximity and similarity to their efforts (Derrida would say
that this proximity is ‘empirical’):
Rosenzweig formulates that first act of philosophizing and
thinking against Hegel with the simple fact that he is alive (and that
he is philosophizing), while Levinas believes that the first act must
be against philosophy, against Hegel, in order to protect the life of
the other and in so doing defend subjectivity.
We both know, writes Rosenzweig to a sanatorium director
into which a sick philosopher is to be placed (and not only the
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50 See F. Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, vol. 2, 130-133, 142-147.
51 See “La communication”, E. Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de
l’essence (The Hague: Kluwer Academic, 1978), 188-193.
52 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969), 220-232 / Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, 243-258.
philosopher, of course; Rosenzweig’s idea is that only com-
mon sense and the power of life itself can remedy the ‘sick-
ness of reason’), that a sick reason can only be cured if it is re-
stored—by an application of some force, if necessary—to its
normal environment. The task is not to ‘infuse’ the patient’s
reason with something new, but to return it to the condition
from which is deviated. We must fight the various mounte-
bank cures, the ointments, the vaccinations, old or new, with
the slogan ‘Environmental treatment’ [“Terrainkur” dürfte
das Schlagwort sein, mit dem wir dem Unfug alter wie neuer
Impf-, Spritz- und Schmierkuren entgegenzutreten hätten] [...]
’Environmental cure’ [eine reine Terrainkur].53
This is Levinas’ ‘wind,’ “une subjectivité libre comme le
vent,”54 “le souffle, la respiration d’un air du dehors, où l’intériorité
s’affranchit d’elle-même, exposée à tous les vents”; “une respiration
profonde jusqu’au souffle coupé par le vent de l’altérité.”55 Opening
for the other begins with breathing, with the lungs (lungs are the real
subject and the real beginning, a beginning before any other begin-
ning). Resistance to Hegel begins with the mistrust of medicine, with
the mistrust of its set practices. Levinas’ first gesture must demolish
“l’association de la philosophie et de l’Etat, de la philosophie et de
la medicine.”56 Only within this context, where philosophy neces-
sarily splits with the state and medicine, can Levinas’ sudden en-
gagement and his alternative allergology be understood. More pre-
cisely, in question is a speech against allergy (“d’une insurmontable
allergie”),57 a discourse against allergy, therefore an appeal for re-
laxation but caution at the same time.
The effort of this book (Totality and Infinity) is directed to-
ward apperceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation with
alterity [une relation non allergique avec l’altérité], toward
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53 F. Rosenzweig, Das Büchlein vom gesunden und kranken Menschenver-
stand, 58, 60 / Understanding the Sick and the Healthy, 60-61.
54 E. Levinas,Totality and Infinity, 22 /Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, 7.
55 E. Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, 276-277.
56 Ibid., 263.
57 “La philosophie est atteinte, depuis son enfance, d’une horreur de l’Autre qui
demeure Autre, d’une insurmontable allergie”. “La trace de l’Autre” (1963), E. Levi-
nas, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 2001), 263.
apperceiving Desire—where power, by essence murderous of
the other, becomes, faced with the other and “against all good
sense,” the impossibility of murder, the consideration of the
other, or justice.58
However, does Levinas’ call for the destruction of allergies to
the other (‘the other’ is not all that allergies encompass, but the word
‘other’or ‘l’absolument Autre’ rapidly explains Levinas’ intention)59
still belong to allergologies? Is an engagement which resists every
form of allergy (therefore, engagement which is ethical60), in other
words, is an allergy to allergies in the domain of allergology? Is an
anti-allergy or counter allergy still an allergy? And would this left-
over allergy, this resistance to every form of allergy towards the
other, be the subject’s last chance?
Can Levinas’ “defence of subjectivity,” from the preface of
the book Totality and Infinity, be formulated in such a way?
It is as if there is something inaccurate and suspicious in the
thematisation of Levinas’ preliminary resistance and dissatisfaction
with the status of the other. It is as if there is something dangerous in
these questions, something which denounces Levinas, betrays him
and immediately troubles us. All these questions—as well as the
forced attention I give to a confused moment which precedes, in
Levinas, the allergy to the other (this can be an allergy to an allergy
to the other or an allergy whose traces remain even when there is no
longer an allergy and no longer an other)—I risk to qualify of ‘philo-
sophical standard, or philosophical mannerism’. This moment (again
Hegel and his Momente) is closely associated with philosophy and
with reading which belongs to the ‘philosophical regime,’ as it
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58 E. Levinas,Totality and Infinity, 47 /Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, 38.
59 “But in order that the presence of the Other does not announce permanent
war and in order that it resists the temptation of idealism, the ultimate signification of
the relation between the Same and the Other must not be interpreted as an allergy. [...]
The putting in question of the I—which coincides with the nonallergic presence of
the Other… [qui coïncide avec la présence non allergique de l’Autre]” E. Levinas,
“Transcendence and Height”, 12, 18 / Liberté et commandement, 63, 83.
60 “The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an
ethical relation [Le rapport avec Autrui ou le Discours, est un rapport non-allergi-
que, un rapport éthique]“; “encounter the Other without allergy, that is, in justice
[rencontrer autrui sans allergie, c’est-à-dire dans la justice]”, Totality and Infinity,
51, 303 / Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, 43, 339.
thematises the non-thematised (for example, an allergy which pre-
cedes the allergy Levinas consistently mentions). This is not all. It is
also an objectification, a reduction, an imposing of horizons, and vi-
olent revelation of violence (violence of allergies and violence
which remains hidden and unnamed as allergy). This is the moment
which sustains and generates philosophy, simultaneously degenerat-
ing it. Only a philosopher, perhaps only Hegel, can say the sentence
which Jacques Derrida spoke: “Levinas is very close to Hegel, much
closer than he admits, and at the very moment when he is apparently
opposed to Hegel in the most radical fashion.” The only thing that
remains for us is to experiment with this moment; one for which it re-
mains unclear who should take responsible: I, Levinas, Derrida,
Hegel or only Hegel, Hegel, and forever Hegel? How then should we
again read, using Derrida’s or Hegel’s methods (how can we
thematise without any thématisations?), the status of allergy in
Levinas or in Hegel, and simultaneously maintain radical resistance
to Hegel, Levinas, or Derrida? A question such as this can be pre-
ceded by new questions and new answers in relation to allergy be-
fore allergy or violence before violence, or in general, in connection
with the attributes of violence.
If we were now to follow, Derrida’s readings and philosophi-
cal standards, completely new consequences are revealed, but sim-
ply put, Hegel, will no longer be so closely associated with Levinas.
There are several stages of this one moment:
– Levinas introduces allergy as a negative strategy and calls
(us) (in the vocative) to resist, negate or develop an allergy towards
it. The Other is not thematised or “placed” in the accusative61, rather,
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61 “I could not possibly speak of the Other, make of the Other a theme, pro-
nounce the Other as object, in the accusative. I can only, I must only speak to the ot-
her; that is, I must call him in the vocative, which is not a category, a case of speech,
but, rather the bursting forth, the very raising up of speech.” “What, then, is the en-
counter with the absolutely-other [rencontre de l’absolument-autre]? Neither repre-
sentation, nor limitation, nor conceptual relation to the same. The ego and the other
do not permit themselves to be dominated or made into totalities by a concept of rela-
tionship. And first of all because the concept (material of language), which is always
given to the other, cannot encompass the other, cannot include the other. The dative or
vocative dimension which opens the original direction of language, cannot lend itself
to inclusion in and modification by the accusative or attributive dimension of the ob-
ject without violence.” J. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics. An Essay on the
the negation of the other is thematised or the allergy towards the
other itself. Thematisation without thematisation is achieved
through Levinas’ swift change of plan and rapid transition from ac-
cusative to vocative, meaning through a call for the negation of ne-
gation (that is, an allergy to allergy).
– Levinas will be close to Hegel and within the frames of
Hegel’s negation of negation only if this call is put aside, if the voca-
tive is pushed aside, and only if the concept of the “other” is placed
back into Hegel’s milieu (where the other is my negation, where the
other is a negation of the same).
– In this case, and only in this case (this is the case when, in
one’s reading, we look for oversights, blind spots, ignorance, sub-
conscious, unthematised fields), the subject will be constituted
through the process of revealing the other, that is through the process
of destroying negation or everything that negates the other. The sub-
ject confirms himself (the subject is defended) as he destroys all that
negates the other, as he becomes allergic to every allergy towards the
other. Or rather, the subject preserves the other only if it destroys
what negates the other.
– It now becomes simple to follow two new elements ex-
panded in Levinas, before and after Derrida’s intervention: (a) that
violence is necessary, that the subject is violent, that necessary vio-
lence which precedes every possible violence is set aside; this vio-
lence is complementary to the violence of thematisation (Derrida’s
endeavoured to desubstantialise violence in Levinas, to find one or
several acceptable attributes of violence; I believe that his interven-
tion was not entirely justified); (b) that the possibility of violence al-
ways appears with a third, that is, with one who negates the
other—this could be in the place of allergy (over time Levinas recog-
nizes the subject of violence or the violent subject who defends its
neighbour as the state or as the justified state violence; Derrida’s
sensitivity, deliberation, and consideration towards Israel and Pales-
tinians, is always in dialogue with Levinas).
Despite the fact that between Rosenzweig and Levinas, be-
tween two modes of the same intervention on which I am insisting,
the figure of the other has changed and become more dangerous than
70
PE
TA
R
BO
JA
N
IÆ
Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” 103, 95 / “Violence et métaphysique. Essai sur la
pensée d’Emmanuel Levinas”, 152, 140-141.
ever,62 it seems to me that there is no room for hesitation: first,
Levinas’ allergy definitely refers to Hegel’s ‘theory of the other’;
second, allergy is, for Levinas, an absolute and perfect synonym for
Hegel’s homeopathy—isn’t the furious reaction and allergy to the
other, to medicine / poison, crucial for Hegel?, isn’t provoking resis-
tance and the allergy of the organism towards the other, the essence
of homeopathic therapy?; third, Levinas’ substitution of homeopa-
thy with allergy turns Hegel upside-down—what is therapy for
Hegel is still sickness for Levinas; fourth, Levinas’new step, and re-
sistance to allergy is more than the usual resistance to homeopa-
thy—allergy assumes the harmlessness and the innocence of the
other, while anti-allergy necessitates the examination of the secret of
fiction and fantasy about the dangerous and toxic other; fifth, the
over-occupation with one’s own resistance and allergy to the other,
frees and relieves the other—the other (“l’autre inassimilable” in
both Hegel and Levinas), still helps in constituting Levinas’ new
subjectivity, but not as in a homeopathic construction, as the other
who fictitiously bombards and attacks the organism.
The relation with the other—the absolutely other [absol-
ument autre]—who has no frontier with the same is not ex-
posed to the allergy that afflicts the same in a totality, upon
which the Hegelian dialectic rests. The other is not for reason
a scandal which launches it into dialectical movement… The
alleged scandal of alterity presupposes the tranquil identity of
the same [l’identité tranquille du Même], a freedom sure of
itself which is exercised without scruples, and to whom the
foreigner brings only constraint and limitation.63
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62 I’m not only referring to the wars and horrible crimeswhich separate Rosen-
zweig and Levinas, but also to the ‘contributions’ to the ‘theory of the other’by some
of the authors close to Levinas or whom he could have read. All of these authors de-
termine the other as the enemy, however; not exclusively as an enemy who should be
destroyed or assimilated, bur as an enemy who destroys and attacks. It is unclear if
Levinas ever read Schmitt-Dorotiè, who Meinecke mentions; did he read Jünger,
whose analyses of the hero, war and peace are noticeable in the book Totalité et infini;
was Levinas aware of some of Heidegger’s views on the enemy from his 1934 semi-
nar (GA 36/37); did he ever consult with Husserl’s “E manuscripts” from 1934
(“Feindschaft ist die totale Negation des anderen Seins in allen seinen Lebensbetäti-
gungen”, E III 8, S. 12)?
63 Totality and Infinity, 203 / Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, 222.
Levinas’ fragment is a good example of his numerous effort-
less ‘turns’ of Hegel. If we must sketch a position for a new reader
(and a therapist, and immunologist), he will truly have to confirm
and still think this great distance—on one hand, not having a frontier
with the other and the same, and on the other hand “allergie qui
afflige le Même” [the allergy that afflicts the same].
In a book in which he bids his farewell to Levinas, Derrida
circles the concept of allergy many times and in so doing marks a fu-
ture step which is on the path of forever releasing the other of re-
sponsibility for the frontier, for allergy, for affliction and for pain.64
The introduction or the sketch of an introduction (or simply a
“sketch of a sketch”) of a name signifying a rare disease, is the per-
fect addition and substitute for allergy. Namely, it is quite hard to de-
fine the precise differences between allergy and autoimmunisation.
Is allergy simply one of the many autoimmune illnesses or is
autoimmunisation a particular aspect of every allergy? The answer is
quite complicated; however, the accent and deciding factor is this
‘auto,’ and this is also an addition to Levinas. The precision of
Derrida’s intervention, as the accuracy of Levinas’ engagement, is
truly diverse: immunis supposes only a single part of the organism or
system; this is a privileged part with a special status (that is why it is
called the immune system) whose chief characteristic is not only to
protect the whole system, but rather it is the part where the other ap-
pears and is recognized as the other;65 a part which recognizes the
other simultaneously recognizing its own limits; the immune system
can and cannot recognize the other, nor can it differentiate its own
destructive elements (cancer or AIDS); this part can protect its own
system from the other, but can also tolerate the other; the immune
system can be lulled and drugged (“la désensibilisation”66) and it
can tolerate the other above limits (“à faciliter la tolérance de
certaines greffes d’organes”) or above all its own limits; the immune
system can also produce the other within itself and from itself (hor-
ror autotoxicus), and then destroy it.
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64 E. Levinas, Adieu, à Emmanuel Levinas, 43, 57, 91-94, 127, 157, 160-162,
167-168.
65 “The immune substances... in the manner of magic bullets, seek out the ene-
my” (Paul Ehrlich).
66 The concept of Paul Ehrlich. See A. M. Silverstein, A History of Immunolo-
gy (London: Academic Press, Inc., 1989), 160.
Derrida rarely uses the nominative (“auto-immunité”), he in-
sists on the process or the logic of auto-immunitaire and uses differ-
ing excessive descriptions (la logique terrifiante, fatale, suicidaire,
étrange, indispensable, etc). He repeats Levinas’s or Michelet’s ges-
ture: returning this logic (or this word) into the political-law space
from which it was born, in order to profit from the bio-medical con-
structions and mechanisms that this illness implies (conversely,
Hegel also confirms this tactic: homeopathy did not come from ther-
apeutics into the political logic of the sovereign or philosopher,
rather it was the other way around).67 But it is here, with this change
of context, that this rare illness or this rare family of illnesses sud-
denly becomes something necessary and elementary within one
community, society, or state. All this seems to be completely impre-
cise and forceful, including the definition of this logic which Derrida
ceaselessly repeats (“As for the process of auto-immunization,
which interests us particularly here, it consists for a living organism,
as is well known and in short, of protecting itself against its self-pro-
tection by destroying its own immune system [à se protéger en
somme contre son autoprotection en détruisant ses propres défenses
immunitaires]”)68. Apart from this, Derrida lacks Levinas’ vocative
and any sort of call for the negation of this destructive self-negation.
There is no call for the isolation and destruction of this logic; rather,
Derrida always speaks of it in the accusative, as if speaking of an oc-
currence which happens continuously and in parallel within the state
or anywhere else (“Ones again the state is both self-protecting and
self-destroying, at ones remedy and poison. The pharmakon is an-
other name, an old name, for this autoimmunitary logic”).69
But what is fatal in this logic, if it can still be thematised and
calculated in the ‘living system’or ‘living organism’? What is it that
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67 Ibid., 1.
68 J. Derrida, Foi et savoir, 67 / “Faith and Knowledge”, 80. The police does
not destroy the police, just as the immune system does not destroy the immune sys-
tem. When they receive the wrong information from monitoring cells, the so-called
killer cells do not kill themselves; rather they attack other living, healthy cells, of the
same living organism. In question is a mix-up of levels, a mix-up of murder with sui-
cide, changes and conflicts with identity, and, of course, complete limitation of the
concept of survival.
69 J. Derrida, Philosophy in a time of Terror, 124 / Le “concept” du 11 septem-
bre, Dialogues à New York avec G. Borradori (Paris: Galilée, 2004), 182.
is fatal to this ‘fatal logic’ auto-immunitaire? An excess of violence
or violence which cannot be a part of any sort of economy of vio-
lence forces Derrida to correct himself. Here are several sentences
from Derrida’s book Voyous:
For what I call the autoimmune consists not only in harming or
ruining oneself [à se nuire ou à se ruiner], indeed in destroy-
ing one’s own protections, and in doing so oneself, commit-
ting suicide or threatening to do so [à se suicider ou à menacer
de le faire], but, more seriously still, and through this, in
threatening the I [moi] or the self [soi], the ego or the autos,
ipseity itself, compromising the immunity of the autos itself: it
consists not only in compromising oneself [s’auto-entamer]
but in compromising the self, the autos – and thus ipseity. It
consists not only in committing suicide but in compromising
sui- or self-referentiality, the self or sui- of suicide itself.
Autoimmunity is more or less suicidal, but, more seriously
still, it threatens always to rob suicide itself of its meaning and
supposed integrity [L’auto-immunité est plus ou moins
suicidaire, mais c’est encore plus grave: l’auto-immunité
menace toujours de priver le suicide lui-même de son sens et
de son intégrité suppose].70
It seems that the circle of violence towards the other can only
now be completed. Levinas’ radical move as bringing himself into
question can now be recognized as ringing an end to the border be-
tween the same and the other. The foundations of violence which
auto-immunology attempts to truly thematise must be thought again
in confrontation with hypochondria as auto-assimilation and as the
prototype of every illness according to Hegel. But not only this. The
success which homeopathy achieves in the therapies of patients with
autoimmune illnesses (these sorts of accounts and experiences
should never be considered of secondary importance) confirms
Hegel’s presence and demands from us the discovery of a new radi-
cal approach.
“Derrida is very close to Hegel, much closer than he admits,
and at the very moment…”
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70 J. Derrida, Rogues, Two essays on reason, trans. P. A. Braut and M. Naas
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 45 / Voyous, 71.
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POLITISCHE IKONOGRAPHIE: DER KRANKE PHILOSOPH
UND DER ANDERE ALS GIFT ÜBER GEWALT UND
HYPOCHONDRIE
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Studie versuche ich, Levinas’ Lektüre von Hegel und sein Ver-
ständnis der Gewalt, des Feindes und des Krieges zu rekonstruieren, indem ich auf
Franz Rosenzweigs Texte über Hegels Staat und Derridas Interpretation der unter-
schiedlichen Attribute der Gewalt bei Emmanuel Levinas zurückgreife. Mich inter-
essieren die Klassifizierung einiger Figuren der Gewalt aus unterschiedlichen
Perioden von Hegels Leben und die Spuren dieser Figuren in Levinas’Texten, begin-
nend mit Liberté et commandement aus dem Jahr 1953. Die Analyse von Hegels
berühmter Analogie zwischen Souveränität und Organismus aus seiner Rechtsphilo-
sophie bzw. die parallele Lektüre einiger Abschnitte seiner Naturphilosophie wird
die Verbindung zwischen Totalität und Gewalt sowie Levinas’ Konzept einer
Ontologie als Allergologie bzw. als Derridas Autoimmunologie erklären.
Schlüsselwörter: Krankheit, Gewalt, Andere, Souveränität, Philosoph, Al-
lergie, Homöopathie, Immunologie
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